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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

ARIZONA
In re the Gen. Adjudication Of All Rights To Use Water In The Gila
River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
federal reserved water rights doctrine applies to groundwater, and that the
holders of federal reserved water rights can invoke federal law to protect
their groundwater to the extent necessary to fulfill the reserved rights, even
if they would enjoy greater protection than state law water rights holders).
Comprehensive and contentious litigation regarding the waters within
the Upper Salt, Verde, Upper Gila, Lower Gila, Agua Fria, Upper Santa
Cruz, and San Pedro watersheds began in 1988. This opinion was the third
in a series that addressed issues accepted for interlocutory review by the
Arizona Supreme Court. Here, the Arizona Supreme Court held that
federal reserved water rights extended to groundwater to the extent that
groundwater was necessary to accomplish the purpose of a reservation.
The court also held that holders of federal reserved rights were entitled,
under federal law, to greater protection than state law holders to the extent
necessary to maintain sufficient water to accomplish the purpose of a
reservation. While the court tackled the scope of federal water rights, it
refused to declare a standard for determining the purpose of a reservation
and also refused to define how imminent a threat to a reservation's
essential waters must be in order to grant injunctive relief.
Before reaching federal reserved rights doctrine, the court discussed
the current state of Arizona water law by stating that prior appropriation
governed surface water; reasonable use governed groundwater; and
somewhere in the middle existed subflow, which marked a zone where
water pumped from a well so appreciably diminished the surface waters
that it was also governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation. While
admitting that subflow was a legal artifice, the court reaffirmed this
bifurcation of state water law because of the enormous agricultural,
industrial, mining, and urban reliance on such tenets.
The court, however, broke new ground in stating that groundwater was
subject to the federal reserved rights doctrine. In doing so, the court found
several arguments persuasive. First, the court acknowledged that some
Indian reservations depended, either substantially or entirely, upon the
pumping of underground water. The court reasoned that the United States
could not have reserved land for habitation without reserving the water
necessary to sustain life. Therefore, the United States must have intended
the implied reservation of water to come from whatever particular source
each reservation had at hand. Second, the court looked to United States
Supreme Court precedent to determine that federal water rights were
shaped by the integral nature of the hydrologic cycle, not legal artifice. By
analogy to the holding in United States v. Cappaert, the court determined
that because federal reserved rights decline to differentiate between surface
and groundwater when addressing the diversion of protected waters, the
law would similarly decline to differentiate between surface and
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groundwater when identifying the water to be protected. Third, federal
water rights must have continued through the years. Thus, the theoretical
equality of the reasonable use doctrine did not protect federal water rights
holders from a total future depletion of underlying aquifers by offreservation pumpers.
Arizona had already consumed far more
groundwater under the reasonable use doctrine than nature could replenish;
thus, continuing to apply this state law to federal reserved rights would
defeat the federal water rights, in violation of federal substantive law.
In the end, a federal reserved right to groundwater might only be found
where other waters were inadequate to accomplish the purpose of a
reservation. To determine the purpose of a reservation and the water
necessary to achieve it, the court engaged in a fact-intensive inquiry on a
reservation-by-reservation basis.
Once a right to groundwater was
established, the federal holders could invoke the greater protections of
federal law to protect their water rights from off-reservation groundwater
pumping. However, this right did not require a zero-impact standard of
protection for federal reserved rights.
Susan Klopman
ARKANSAS
White v. J.H. Hamlen & Son Co., 1 S.W.3d 464 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999)
(precluding summary judgment because material questions of fact existed
regarding whether land changes were caused by accretion or avulsion, and
whether the land formation was a sandbar or island).
White and several neighboring property owners ("White") appealed a
summary judgment order quieting title to a portion of Hardin Island owned
by J.H. Hamlen & Son Co. ("Hamlen"). Hardin Island was originally a
peninsula connected to the west side of the mainland and surrounded by the
meandering Arkansas River. In 1966, the government completed a project
designed to straighten the river's course and severed the peninsula from the
mainland, creating Hardin Island. Hamlen acquired title to a portion of
Hardin Island in 1982. White had title to property across the former river
channel (now slackwater) and to the east of Hardin Island since the mid1940's or early 1950's. The southeastern portion of the island claimed by
Hamlen was also included in the metes and bounds descriptions of White's
property.
The lower court granted Hamlen's motion for summary judgment to
quiet title in the disputed land based on aerial photographs and a set of
drawings prepared by a registered land surveyor admitted as exhibits by
Hamlen.
These exhibits evidenced Hamlen's theory that land along
White's riparian boundary was gradually eroded and deposited on Hardin
Island, thereby vesting title in Hamlen's increased land mass. White did
not dispute the changes as portrayed in Hamlen's exhibits. Instead, he
asserted that the exhibits did not prove whether the changes were caused by

